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The Price of Paid Prioritization 
The International and Domestic Consequences of the 
Failure to Protect Net Neutrality in the United States
Arturo J. Carrillo and Dawn C. Nunziato
On 10 November 2014, President Obama reaffirmed his 
commitment to a free and open Internet and called on the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to “imple-
ment the strongest possible rules to protect net neutrality.”1 
In particular, the president recommended that the FCC 
reclassify broadband providers as telecommunications ser-
vices subject to common carriage obligations. The president 
was responding to the No Commercially Unreasonable Prac-
tices section of the May 2014 Proposed Rules for Promoting 
and Protecting an Open Internet, which would have autho-
rized broadband providers to accord differentiated treat-
ment to Internet traffic, thereby undermining net neutrality 
and common carriage principles in the United States.
As written, the Proposed Rules of May 2014 would have 
violated international trade and human rights obligations 
of the United States. This is because, as a member of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and a party to the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 
the United States is bound to respect principles of nondis-
crimination and free expression when regulating essential 
communications media like the Internet. Any FCC rule that 
does not meaningfully protect net neutrality at all levels of 
interconnectivity would run afoul of these legal obligations 
and expose the United States to legal action by other govern-
ments and individuals prejudiced by its actions. 
On March 12, 2015, the FCC adopted a new set of rules 
to promote and protect an open Internet.2 In its 2015 Open 
Internet Order, the FCC reclassified broadband providers 
as common carriers subject to nondiscrimination obliga-
tions and enshrined strong net neutrality protections. The 
2015 Order, contrary to its predecessors, largely meets the 
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requirements of the international trade 
and human rights treaties to which the 
United States is a party. Even so, gaps 
in the new Rules mean that the United 
States may still be liable under inter-
national law for potential failures to 
ensure that net neutrality and non-dis-
crimination principles are adequately 
protected.
In this Article, we first examine the 
trade and human rights obligations 
of the United States as they relate to 
net neutrality to determine the extent 
to which each of the two most recent 
approaches adopted by the FCC to pro-
mote an open Internet would comply 
with those obligations. We also examine 
the history of regulation of broadband 
providers as common carriers subject to 
nondiscrimination obligations under 
U.S. law. We conclude that the FCC 
has, by and large, successfully com-
plied with its international trade and 




quences of FCC Failure to 
Adopt Strong Net Neutrality 
Rules. The United States is bound 
by the WTO’s General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS), and has 
additionally signed on to the Basic 
Agreement on Trade in Telecommuni-
cations Services (BATS), committing to 
regulating its telecommunications ser-
vices on the basis of several principles 
that are essential to net neutrality.3 
In particular, the BATS enshrines the 
United States’ commitment to ensure 
that “interconnection” in telecommu-
nications services, including Internet 
service, be provided to the service sup-
pliers of other WTO Member States on 
nondiscriminatory terms.4 A failure by 
the FCC to meaningfully protect net 
neutrality would violate the terms of the 
BATS.5
The BATS integrates clear non-dis-
crimination principles into its primary 
obligations. It covers packet-switched 
services, including broadband servic-
es, which the United States “expressly 
included [in the Agreement] to protect 
its growing IP-based services provid-
ers.”6 The BATS commitments for IP-
based services include several key prin-
ciples that converge with net neutrality, 
including transparency, anti-compet-
itive practices, and, most important-
ly, fair interconnection.7 Under the 
BATS, fair interconnection “will be 
ensured at any technically feasible point 
in the network” and is to be provided 
“under nondiscriminatory terms”; “in 
a timely fashion”; and at “cost-oriented 
rates that are transparent, reasonable, 
[economically feasible], and sufficiently 
unbundled so that the supplier need 
not pay for network components or 
facilities that it does not require for the 
service to be provided.”8
What this means is that, if the FCC 
had retained the May 2014 Proposed 
Rules, or adopted similar rules allow-
ing broadband providers to accord 
differentiated treatment to Internet 
traffic, it would have contravened the 
United States’ legal obligations under 
the GATS and the BATS to ensure 
fair interconnection for foreign service 
suppliers. Such standards would have 
allowed broadband providers to engage 
in individual negotiations for paid pri-
oritization with edge providers to cre-
ate “fast” and “slow” lanes for Internet 
service,9 which by definition would vio-
late the requirement in the BATS that 
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interconnection be provided on non-
discriminatory terms.10 Adopting such 
a rule would thus have left the United 
States open to the risk of a WTO com-
plaint by other WTO member States 
on behalf of their disadvantaged service 
suppliers.11
Similarly, the United States would 
have been at odds with key trade part-
ners in Latin America and Europe. Net 
neutrality is of particular importance 
in Latin America, where approximately 
85 percent of the region by population 
and trade lives under a legal regime 
that strongly protects this principle. 
Over the last five years Paraguay, Chile, 
Mexico, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, 
Argentina, and Brazil have all adopted 
legislation or regulation guaranteeing 
net neutrality. More to the point, at 
least 90 percent of all Latin American 
Internet traffic passes through Miami 
and would therefore be subject in some 
form to U.S. regulation.12 If the FCC 
had not guaranteed strong protection 
for net neutrality, as do most of the 
countries in Latin America, the nega-
tive impact on trade in the region would 
have been severe.13
Rules like those proposed by the 
FCC in May 2014 have had the poten-
tial to hinder trade with Europe as well, 
another continent that is, by and large, 
embracing strong net neutrality pro-
tections. In April 2014, the European 
Parliament passed the European Com-
mission’s proposed telecoms reforms 
that will enable a Digital Single Mar-
ket,14 including guarantees safeguarding 
net neutrality and strict rules for the 
blocking and slowing of Internet ser-
vices.15 The Netherlands, Slovenia, the 
United Kingdom, and Norway, among 
others, have enshrined meaningful net 
neutrality protections through legisla-
tion or regulation,16 and France and 
Germany are currently considering 
similar legislation.17
As it turned out, the FCC chose to 
follow President Obama’s exhortations 
and adopt in its 2015 Open Inter-
net Order a framework for regulating 
the Internet in the United States that 
is strongly protective of net neutral-
ity in several respects. First, the FCC 
defined the scope of its new Rules as 
applying to “both fixed and mobile 
broadband Internet access service.”18 
Second, the FCC enacted three bright-
line rules that go to the heart of net 
neutrality protections: no blocking;19 
no throttling;20 and no paid prioritiza-
tion.21 Finally, the FCC devised a way to 
reach other types of conduct that may 
[If the FCC] adopted rules allowing broadband pro-
viders to accord differentiated treatment to Internet 
traffic, it would have contravened the United 
States’ legal obligations under the GATS and 
the BATS to ensure fair interconnection for foreign 
service suppliers.
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not come under the bright-line rules 
by establishing its “no unreasonable 
interference/disadvantage standard.”22 
Under this rule, ISPs cannot unrea-
sonably interfere with or disadvantage 
either end users’ ability to use and 
access broadband service or Internet 
content or edge providers’ ability to 
make such content available to end 
users.23 
So is the United States now in 
full compliance with the above-cited 
provisions of the GATS and BATS? 
Not quite, due to two gaps in coverage 
created by the 2015 Order. First, the 
FCC determined that it would not 
apply a bright line rule to flatly prohibit 
sponsored data or “zero rating” plans 
but would instead evaluate these on 
a case-by-case basis under the “no 
unreasonable interference/disadvantage 
standard.”24 Zero rating usually refers 
to the practice of Internet companies 
paying certain telecommunications to 
offer “free” access for their mobile 
network customers to the sponsoring 
companies’ online services, which is 
realized by exempting traffic to the 
companies’ sites from a subscriber’s 
data caps or allowing customers without 
a data plan access to those sites.25 Since 
zero rating is a deviation from net 
neutrality — as sponsored data is given 
priority over non-sponsored data – the 
FCC’s eventual approval of any zero 
rating plans could prove problematic 
for the reasons noted above. Second, 
the FCC similarly ruled that none 
of the bright-line rules or standards 
relating to broadband Internet access 
service would apply to “Internet traffic 
exchange arrangements,” also known as 
“interconnection.”26 Interconnection 
refers to the interface of networks 
with other networks in the exchange 
of Internet traffic.27 The FCC decided 
that, “for the time being”, extending 
robust net neutrality protections to 
such exchange arrangements “was not 
warranted.”28 Instead, interconnection 
disputes will be reviewed on a case-by-
case basis for practices that might be 
construed as unreasonable or unjust29 
— a broad and vague standard.30 As 
a result, the door remains open for 
discriminatory agreements such as those 
involving paid prioritization to occur 
within interconnection arrangements, 
for example, between ISPs and backbone 
content delivery networks (CDNs).31 
Any dissonance in net neutrality rules 
between the United States and major 
trading partners in Latin America and 
Europe could set the stage for possible 
disputes down the road. Under WTO 
rules, “[a] dispute arises when one 
country adopts a trade policy measure 
or takes some action that one or more 
fellow-WTO members considers to be 
breaking the WTO agreements, or to 
be a failure to live up to obligations.”32 
Indeed, the United States has engaged the 
Any dissonance in net neutrality rules be-
tween the United States and major trading partners in 
Latin America and Europe could set the stage for pos-
sible disputes down the road.
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WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 
on behalf of its own interconnection 
interests. In 2000, the United States 
made several claims against Mexico 
for violations of Mexico’s Schedule 
of Commitments, which includes the 
BATS Reference Paper.33 In 2004, a 
WTO panel concluded that Mexico 
had violated its GATS commitments by 
failing “to ensure interconnection at 
cost-oriented rates,” failing to “prevent 
anti-competitive practices by firms 
that are major telecoms suppliers,” 
and failing “to ensure reasonable and 
non-discriminatory access to and use 
of telecommunications networks.”34 In 
response to the WTO panel’s findings, 
Mexico has now complied with the 
panel report to the satisfaction of both 
the WTO DSB and the United States.35 
In sum, several factors under the 
GATS and the BATS weighed against 
the May 2014 Proposed Rules and in 
favor of enforcing strong net neutrality 
rules in compliance with U.S. obliga-
tions, which the United States largely, 
but not entirely, succeeded in doing 
through the adoption of the 2015 Open 
Internet Order. The United States has 
not been shy in utilizing the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body to further 
its own telecommunications interests. 
Accordingly, the United States could 
hardly claim surprise if and when other 
member States follow suit to contest 
the new FCC rules because the 2015 
Order seems to authorize zero rat-
ing plans under certain circumstances, 
while expressly excluding interconnec-
tion from the scope of its net neutral-
ity protections. These gaps in the 2015 
Order’s net neutrality protections may 
eventually lead to inconsistencies with 
WTO nondiscrimination obligations 
due to foreign IP-based services and 
required by the aforementioned trade 
agreements.36 
International Human Rights 
Consequences if the FCC Failed 
to Adopt Strong Net Neutral-
ity Rules. If the FCC had enacted the 
May 2014 Proposed Rules, or others 
like them, that action would have also 
violated the United States’ internation-
al human rights obligations to promote 
and protect freedom of expression in a 
non-discriminatory manner. Allowing 
broadband providers to accord differ-
entiated or discriminatory treatment to 
Internet traffic would have impermis-
sibly impinged on the rights of all per-
sons to equally seek, receive, and impart 
information, ideas, and opinions in 
the media of their choice.37 As noted in 
the prior section, the FCC avoided this 
pitfall by adopting several bright-line 
rules in its 2015 Open Internet Order 
to protect net neutrality in broadband 
access service. It failed, however, to 
extend these protections to intercon-
nection arrangements, leaving the door 
open to potential abuse. It likewise 
failed to ban zero rating, a per se excep-
tion to net neutrality. Thus, the United 
States is arguably still vulnerable in the 
human rights arena as well.
The United States is bound to respect 
and protect freedom of expression in 
a non-discriminatory manner, inter 
alia, under the United Nations’ ICCPR 
and the American Declaration of the 
Rights and Duties of Man (ADHR or 
American Declaration).38 Both the 
ICCPR and ADHR enshrine freedom 
of expression and non-discrimination 
as fundamental rights that States must 
promote and protect.39 Freedom of 
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expression is the right to seek, receive, 
and impart information, ideas, and 
opinions “through any media and 
regardless of frontiers.”40 It is well set-
tled that this right is protected equally 
online as it is offline.41 Accordingly, 
“the treatment of Internet data and 
traffic [cannot be] based on the device, 
content, author, origin and/or destina-
tion of the content, service or applica-
tion.”42 States “should take all necessary 
steps to foster the independence of [the 
Internet] and to ensure access of indi-
viduals thereto.”43 
Paid prioritization and other 
discriminatory arrangements may 
act as impermissible restrictions on 
freedom of expression by making access 
to certain kinds of content or networks 
more or less difficult depending on 
whether an individual or company 
has economic leverage to access those 
preferential arrangements. Only the 
wealthiest companies and organizations 
are generally able to afford to pay for 
prioritization or preferential treatment 
to make their information and content 
more readily accessible to users.44 
The ability to access information — 
another important component of 
freedom of expression — may also be 
curtailed for those persons or entities 
that cannot or choose not to pay the 
premiums associated with prioritization 
or enhanced access to networks or 
information. 
Although a State may under certain 
circumstances place some restrictions 
on freedom of expression, it may do 
so only if it meets certain criteria. 
Any proposed restrictions must (a) be 
“provided by law”;45 (b) for a legitimate 
aim such as national security, public 
order, or public health and morals;46 
and (c) must be proportional, necessary, 
and “directly related to the specific 
need on which they are predicated.”47 
Increasing corporate profits by 
providing a competitive advantage to 
well-resourced service providers or 
networks is not a legitimate rationale 
recognized by international law for 
(relatively) restricting users’ freedom 
of expression. This suggests that both 
sponsored data plans as well as paid 
prioritization at the interconnection 
level may run afoul of the ICCPR’s and 
the American Declaration’s freedom 
of expression and non-discrimination 
rules. 
Any failure to fulfill its human rights 
obligations under international law 
could expose the United States to 
denunciations by affected individu-
als, NGOs, and perhaps other gov-
ernments, as in the trade arena. On 
the one hand, grievances can be aired 
at hearings before the Inter-American 
Commission of Human Rights, the 
body that monitors compliance by OAS 
member States with regional human 
rights agreements like the American 
…paid prioritization at the interconnection 
level may run afoul of the ICCPR’s and the American 
Declaration’s freedom of expression and non-dis-
crimination rules.
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Declaration. On the other, advocates 
can denounce U.S. failures to pro-
tect freedom of expression at hear-
ings before the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee, the UN authority 
that monitors State compliance with 
the ICCPR. As a State Party to that 
treaty, the United States is subject to a 
periodic review of its compliance with 
that treaty by the Human Rights Com-
mittee, an independent body composed 
of 18 international experts.48 Both the 
Inter-American Commission and the 
UN Human Rights Committee publish 
their final determinations of States’ 
compliance with the respective treaty 
obligations monitored. 
The FCC’s Regulation of 
Broadband Providers as Com-
mon Carriers Subject to Non-
discrimination Obligations 
Under U.S. Law. The FCC’s 
March 2015 Rules mark an important 
step toward correcting the mistake the 
FCC made in 2002 when it declined to 
classify broadband providers as “tele-
communications services” subject to 
common carriage obligations under the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996. In 
reclassifying broadband providers as 
common carriers, the FCC harmo-
nizes the treatment of Internet forums 
for expression with the United States’ 
historic treatment of other forums for 
communication under the long-recog-
nized common carriage doctrine. 
The common carriage doctrine 
imposes obligations on privately-owned 
speech and mass communication con-
duits to facilitate the expression of oth-
ers and prohibits these conduits from 
exercising the discretion to determine 
which communications to facilitate and 
which to censor. Since the beginning of 
the modern communications era in the 
1930s, the FCC has imposed obliga-
tions on providers of interstate com-
munications services (like telephone 
and telegraph companies) to facilitate 
the transmission of all legal content. 
The United States Postal Service has 
also been regulated as a common car-
rier that is required to facilitate the 
transmission of all legal content and is 
prohibited from discriminating against 
such content. 49 As Ithiel de Sola Pool 
explains:
[T]he law of common carriage 
protects ordinary citizens in 
their right to communicate. The 
rules against discrimination are 
designed to ensure access to the 
means of communication…. [T]
his element of civil liberty is cen-
tral to the law of [common car-
riage].50  
The common carriage status of com-
munications providers benefits mem-
bers of the public by granting them 
access to communications conduits 
under a nondiscrimination principle. 
As Jerome Barron observed, individu-
als who rely on common carriers to 
facilitate their communications “ben-
efit from the democratic egalitarianism 
that characterizes the nondiscrimina-
tory access principle associated with 
common carrier law.”51 
Congress overhauled the regulation 
of telecommunications providers in 
the Communications Act of 1934,52 
which charged the newly-created FCC 
with regulatory authority over telecom-
munications providers (telegraph and 
telephone companies), regardless of 
whether they enjoyed monopoly power, 
and imposed common carriage reg-
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ulations on such providers.53 Under 
the 1934 Act, common carriers were 
charged with the obligation to serve 
as nondiscriminatory conduits for all 
(legal) content originated by others.54 
Throughout the mid-twentieth cen-
tury, common carriage and nondis-
crimination obligations were applied 
to traditional conduits of communica-
tion like telephone companies. In the 
early 1970s, the FCC began to consider 
whether and to what extent to impose 
common carriage obligations on com-
puter-assisted processes and services. In 
a series of “Computer Inquiries,” the 
FCC essentially created two categories 
of computer-assisted communications 
services — basic services and enhanced 
services. “Basic” (later, “telecommu-
nications”) services, like telephone 
and facsimile services, were those that 
offered straightforward transmission 
services, and those offering such ser-
vices were regulated as common carriers 
and made subject to nondiscrimination 
requirements.55 “Enhanced” (later, 
“information services”) were those in 
which computer processing applica-
tions were implemented to act on a 
subscriber’s information, and provid-
ers of such services were exempt from 
common carriage and nondiscrimina-
tion requirements.
In its passage of the Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996, Congress revisited 
the categorization of services subject 
to common carriage regulation that 
was established under the Computer 
Inquiries. Under the 1996 Act, “tele-
communications” services were made 
subject to common carriage regulation 
(replacing the category of “basic servic-
es”), while “information services” were 
exempted from common carriage regu-
lation (replacing the formerly exempt 
category of “enhanced services”).56 The 
Act defined a “telecommunication ser-
vice” as “the offering of telecommu-
nications for a fee directly to the pub-
lic…regardless of the facilities used.”57 
The Act maintained significant com-
mon carrier obligations on providers of 
“telecommunications services,” while 
leaving “information services” provid-
ers subject to far less regulation. While 
the Act creates a presumption that tele-
communications carriers will be treated 
as common carriers, it authorized the 
FCC to forbear from enforcing any 
provision of the Act if the FCC deter-
mines that such enforcement is unnec-
essary to guard against discrimination, 
to ensure just and reasonable services, 
to safeguard consumers, or to serve the 
public interest.58 Title II of the Com-
munications Act sets forth a complex 
regulatory regime imposed upon com-
mon carriers, but the essential duty 
imposed upon common carriers is the 
duty not to discriminate in the offering 
of their services, and in particular, not 
to discriminate against certain types of 
content in serving as conduits for the 
transmission of such content. 
In its 2002 “Inquiry Concerning 
High-Speed Access to the Internet over 
Cable and Other Facilities”59 (herein-
after “Declaratory Ruling”), the FCC 
mistakenly concluded that cable modem 
service was an “information service” 
with “no separate offering of ‘telecom-
munications service,’”60 the latter of 
which would have rendered such servic-
es subject to common carriage obliga-
tions. The Commission ruled that the 
provision of cable broadband service 
did not contain a separate telecommu-
nications service because the transmis-
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sion of the data is “part and parcel” of 
that service and is integral to its capa-
bilities.61 As an “information service” 
with “no separate offering of telecom-
munications service,” cable operators’ 
provision of broadband Internet access 
was exempted from the common carrier 
regulations of Title II of the Commu-
nications Act.62
This flawed ruling was significant in 
that it reversed course on the history of 
the Commission’s regulation of tele-
communications services. Throughout 
the 1970s and 1980s, the FCC for-
mulated and implemented a workable 
distinction between the underlying 
common carrier network, on the one 
hand, and the services and informa-
tion made available over that network, 
on the other. The 2002 Declaratory 
Ruling collapsed this crucial distinction 
and for the first time permitted com-
munications conduits to discriminate 
against the content they were charged 
with transmitting over their networks.
The FCC’s fundamental misstep 
in removing common carriage and 
nondiscrimination obligations from 
broadband providers (later approved by 
the Supreme Court in National Cable & 
Telecommunications Association et al. 
v. Brand X Internet Services et al.) was 
its determination that cable operators 
providing broadband Internet access 
were not — in whole or in part — 
offering “telecommunications services” 
and were therefore not subject to 
regulation as common carriers.63 The 
FCC erred in refusing to recognize 
that broadband providers primarily 
offer “telecommunications services” 
to the public and serve as conduits 
for the transmission of the public’s 
information even if they also offer 
some additional “information services.” 
Because it failed to recognize the 
telecommunications service function 
offered by broadband providers, the 
FCC erroneously removed common 
carriage and nondiscrimination 
obligations from broadband providers 
and reversed nearly a century’s worth 
of history embodying “democratic 
egalitarianism that characterizes the 
nondiscriminatory access principle 
associated with common carrier law.”64 
In regulating broadband providers, 
Congress and the FCC should be 
guided by the principle underlying 
modern communications law that 
liberal democracies require a well-
informed citizenry, which in turn 
Congress and the FCC should be guided by the 
principle underlying modern communications law 
that liberal democracies require a well-
informed citizenry, which in turn requires that 
citizens enjoy the freedom to communicate and to 
access communications conduits on a nondiscrimina-
tory basis.
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requires that citizens enjoy the 
freedom to communicate and to 
access communications conduits on 
a nondiscriminatory basis. The same 
principles that justify regulating 
telephone and telegraph operators 
and the postal service as common 
carriers subject to nondiscrimination 
requirements - in order to “protect 
ordinary citizens in their right to 
communicate” - are equally valid when 
applied to broadband providers and 
Internet communications.65
The May 2014 Proposed Rules, 
which would have allowed broadband 
providers to discriminate against what-
ever content or applications they choose 
for whatever reasons they choose, were 
inconsistent with the historical demo-
cratic egalitarian principle of according 
individuals protection in their free-
dom to communicate. Fortunately, the 
March 2015 Rules correct this mistake 
and require broadband providers to 
assume, at minimum, the nondiscrimi-
nation obligations that historically have 
been imposed upon common carriers 
— the duty to facilitate and transmit in a 
nondiscriminatory manner any and all 
legal content.
Conclusion. In March 2015 the FCC 
adopted strong net neutrality rules 
prohibiting broadband service provid-
ers from according differentiated treat-
ment to Internet traffic.66 We trust that, 
as part of its analysis and justification, 
the FCC considered the international 
consequences of its actions, along with 
the domestic ones, to enact rules that 
prohibit the differential treatment of 
Internet traffic based on the economic 
status of the content creator or the end-
user. 
The FCC correctly achieved this goal 
and avoided much, but not all, expo-
sure to international challenge before 
the WTO and international human 
rights bodies by reclassifying broadband 
providers as common carriers subject to 
nondiscrimination obligations under 
U.S. law. The dual issues of zero rat-
ing and interconnection as potential 
threats to strong net neutrality remain 
largely unaddressed in the 2015 Order, 
leaving the door open to possible future 
disputes. Nevertheless, what is certain 
is that by adopting the new Rules, the 
FCC took a substantial step towards 
ensuring meaningful compliance with 
the United States’ international trade 
and human rights obligations with 
respect to nondiscrimination and free-
dom of expression. 
The authors would like to thank GW Law School 
International Human Rights Clinic students Sarah 
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